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Parameterized Algorithmics for Computational Social Choice:
Nine Research Challenges
Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, Jiong Guo,
Rolf Niedermeier , and Gerhard J. Woeginger
Abstract: Computational Social Choice is an interdisciplinary research area involving Economics, Political Science,
and Social Science on the one side, and Mathematics and Computer Science (including Artificial Intelligence and
Multiagent Systems) on the other side. Typical computational problems studied in this field include the vulnerability
of voting procedures against attacks, or preference aggregation in multi-agent systems. Parameterized Algorithmics
is a subfield of Theoretical Computer Science seeking to exploit meaningful problem-specific parameters in order to
identify tractable special cases of in general computationally hard problems. In this paper, we propose nine of our
favorite research challenges concerning the parameterized complexity of problems appearing in this context. This
work is dedicated to Jianer Chen, one of the strongest problem solvers in the history of parameterized algorithmics,
on the occasion of his 60th birthday.
Key words: NP-hard problems; parameterized complexity; fixed-parameter tractability; kernelization; exact
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Introduction

Computational Social Choice[1-7] is a relatively young
interdisciplinary research area that brings together
researchers from fields like Artificial Intelligence,
Decision Theory, Discrete Mathematics, Mathematical
Economics, Operations Research, Political Sciences,
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Social Choice, and Theoretical Computer Science. The
main objective is to improve our understanding of
social choice mechanisms and of algorithmic decision
making. Some concrete questions belonging to this area
are: How should a voter choose between competing
political alternatives? How should this voter rank
these competing alternatives? How should a metasearch engine aggregate many rankings into a single
consensus ranking, reflecting an “optimal” compromise
between various alternatives? A long-term goal is to
improve decision support for decision makers that are
working in a variety of areas like electronic commerce,
logistics, recommender systems, risk assessment, risk
management, and that are fighting with massive data
sets, large combinatorial structures, and uncertain
information.
The general topic is addressed by a biennial
International Workshop on Computational Social
Choice (COMSOC), whose 2012 and 2014 editions
have been held in Kraków/Poland and Pittsburgh/
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Pennsylvania/USA, respectively. Furthermore, the
topic is covered by a number of leading conferences
in Artificial Intelligence (including AAAI, ECAI,
and IJCAI) and by several specialized conferences
(including AAMAS, ADT, EC, SAGT, and WINE). There
are numerous research journals that address many
aspects of computational social choice, including
Artificial Intelligence, ACM Transactions on Economics
and Computation, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research,
Mathematical Social Sciences, Social Choice and
Welfare, and many others (including theoretical as well
as application-oriented journals).
Parameterized Complexity is a branch of
Theoretical Computer Science that started in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. The main objective is
to understand computational problems with respect
to multiple input parameters, and to classify these
problems according to their inherent difficulty. As the
complexity of a problem can be measured as a function
of a multitude of input parameters, this approach allows
to classify NP-hard problems on a much finer scale than
in classical complexity theory (where the complexity
of a problem is only measured with respect to the
number of bits in the input). Parameterized complexity
analysis has been successfully applied in areas as
diverse as Algorithm Engineering, Cognitive Sciences,
Computational Biology, Computational Geometry,
Geographic Information Systems, Machine Learning,
and Psychology, to name a few. The first systematic
work on Parameterized Complexity is the 1999 book[8]
by Downey and Fellows.
This article suggests future research directions
and open problems in the intersection area between
computational social choice and parameterized
complexity. Parts of this intersection area have been
surveyed in a recent paper on the parameterized
complexity analysis of voting problems[9] . The field
holds numerous exciting challenges for researchers on
algorithms and complexity.
Jianer Chen is one of the most influential researchers
in parameterized complexity. During his long and
successful career, he shaped the area by contributing
new methods, new ideas, new insights, and (of course)
dozens of research papers such as Refs. [10-16]. Jianer
Chen also recognized the relevance and the prospects
of parameterized complexity for computational social
choice. In a recent paper[17] , he and his co-workers
analyzed the algorithmic behavior of certain bribery and

359

control questions for so-called d -Approval elections.
We are happy to dedicate this article to our friend
and role model Jianer Chen on the occasion of his
60th birthday.

2

Preliminaries

We summarize some basic concepts and definitions that
will be used throughout this paper.
2.1

Voting

Elections. An election E WD .C; V / consists of a
set C of m alternatives c1 ; c2 ;    ; cm and a list V
of n voters v1 ; v2 ;    ; vn . Each voter v has a linear
order v over the set C which we call a preference
order. For example, let C D fc1 ; c2 ; c3 g be a set of
alternatives. The preference order c1 v c2 v c3 of
voter v indicates that v likes c1 most (the 1st position),
then c2 , and c3 least (the 3rd position). For any two
distinct alternatives c and c 0 , we write c v c 0 if voter
v prefers c over c 0 . We also use the notation v 2 V to
indicate that a voter v is in the list V . By jV j, we mean
the number of voters in V .
Voting rules. A voting rule R is a function that
maps an election to a subset of alternatives, the set
of winners. One prominent voting rule dates back to
Ref. [18]. It selects an alternative as a (unique) winner
if it beats any other alternative in head-to-head contests.
Formally speaking, given an election E D .C; V /, an
alternative c 2 C is a Condorcet winner if any other
alternative c 0 2 C n fcg satisfies
jfv 2 V j c v c 0 gj > jfv 2 V j c 0 v cgj.
It is easy to see that there are elections for which no
alternative is a Condorcet winner. However, if a voting
rule guarantees that a Condorcet winner is elected
whenever there is one, then we say that this rule is
Condorcet-consistent. (Such rules include, e.g., those of
Copeland[19, 20] , of Dodgson[21] , of Kemeny[22, 23] , and
many others.)
Scoring protocols form another well-studied class
of voting rules. A scoring protocol for m alternatives
is defined through a vector .˛1 ;    ; ˛m / of integers,
˛1 >    > ˛m > 0. An alternative receives ˛i points
for each voter that ranks this alternative as i -th best. The
best known examples of (families of) scoring rules
include the Plurality rule (defined through a vector
.1; 0;    ; 0/), d -Approval (defined through vectors of
d ones followed by zeros), and the Borda rule (defined
through vectors .m 1; m 2;    ; 1; 0/).
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2.2

Parameterized complexity

We assume familiarity with basic Computational
Complexity Theory[24, 25] and only provide some
definitions with respect to parameterized complexity
analysis[26-28] .
Let ˙ be an alphabet. A parameterized problem over
˙ is a language L  ˙   ˙  . The second part
of the problem is called the parameter. Usually, this
parameter is a non-negative integer or a tuple of nonnegative integers. For instance, an obvious parameter
in voting is the number of alternatives. Thus, typically
L  ˙   N, where a combined parameter can be
interpreted as the maximum of its integer components.
In the following, let L be a parameterized problem.
Fixed-parameter tractability. We say that L is
fixed-parameter tractable or in FPT if there is an
algorithm that, given an input .I; k/, decides in f .k/ 
jI jO.1/ time whether .I; k/ 2 L. Herein f W N ! N is a
computable function depending only on k.
Kernelization is an alternative way of showing fixedparameter tractability[29-31] . We say that L has a
problem kernel if there is a polynomial-time algorithm
(that is, a kernelization) that given an instance .I; k/,
computes an equivalent instance .I 0 ; k 0 / whose size is
upper-bounded by a function in k, that is,
(1) .I; k/ is a yes-instance if and only if .I 0 ; k 0 / is a
yes-instance, and
(2) j.I 0 ; k 0 /j 6 f .k/ with f W N ! N.
Typically, kernelizations are based on data reduction
rules executable in polynomial time that help shrinking
the instance size. It is known that L has a problem
kernel if and only if L is in FPT[10] . Further, if the
function f in the above kernelization definition is
polynomial, then we also say that L has a polynomialsize problem kernel.
Parameterized intractability. As a central tool
for classifying problems, Parameterized Complexity
Theory provides the W-hierarchy consisting of the
following classes and interrelations[11, 32] :
FPT  WŒ1  WŒ2      WŒt       XP.
To show WŒt-hardness for any positive integer t, we
use the concept of parameterized reduction. Let L and
L0 be two parameterized problems. A parameterized
reduction from L to L0 consists of two functions
f W ˙  ! ˙  and gW N ! N such that for any given
instance .IL ; k/ of L, it holds that
(1) .IL ; k/ is a yes-instance for L if and only if
.f .IL /; g.k// is a yes-instance for L0 , and
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(2) f is computable in FPT time for parameter k,
that is, in h.k/  jIL jO.1/ time.
Problem L0 is WŒt -hard if for any problem L in
WŒt , there is a parameterized reduction from L to
L0 . Typically, to show that some problem L0 is WŒthard, we start from some known WŒt -hard problem L
and reduce L to L0 .

3

Nine Challenges

In this main section of our paper, we describe
nine challenges (indeed, mostly rather problem areas)
that found our specific interest and that shall help
to stimulate fruitful research on the parameterized
complexity of computational social choice problems.
3.1

ILP-based fixed-parameter tractability

Our first challenge relates to a method of establishing
fixed-parameter tractability results. Let us explain
this with the help of one of the most obvious
parameters in the context of voting—the number of
alternatives. For many contexts (for example, political
or committee voting) it is natural to assume that the
number of alternatives is small (particularly when
compared to the number of voters). Hence, it is
important to determine the computational complexity
of various voting problems for the case where the
input contains only few alternatives. Indeed, there
is a number of fixed-parameter tractability results in
terms of the parameter “number m of alternatives”
in the voting context, but many of them rely
on a deep result from combinatorial optimization
due to Lenstra[33] . Moreover, since this result (on
Integer Linear Programming) is mainly of theoretical
interest, this may render corresponding fixed-parameter
tractability results to be of classification nature
only. Fixed-parameter tractability results based on
Integer Linear Programming also tend to give less
insight into the structural properties of the problems
than combinatorial algorithms. The challenge we
pose relates to improving this situation by replacing
integer linear programs with direct combinatorial fixedparameter algorithms.
Integer Linear Programming (ILP) is a strong
classification tool for showing fixed-parameter
tractability[28] . More specifically, Lenstra’s famous
result[33] (see Refs. [34, 35] for some moderate later
running time improvements) implies that a problem
is fixed-parameter tractable if it can be solved by an
integer linear program where the number of variables is
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upper-bounded by a function solely depending on the
considered parameter.
Perhaps the first example for such an “ILP-based”
fixed-parameter tractability result in the context of
computational social choice was implicitly given by
Bartholdi III et al.[36] and later improved by McCabeDansted[37] . They developed an integer linear program
to solve the NP-hard voting problem D ODGSON
S CORE and gave a running time bound based on
Lenstra’s result. Without having explicitly stated this
in their publication, this result yields fixed-parameter
tractability for D ODGSON S CORE with respect to the
parameter number m of alternatives.
Before coming to their integer linear program
formulation for D ODGSON S CORE, we start with
a brief definition of Dodgson voting. The input of
D ODGSON S CORE is an election E D .C; V /, a
distinguished alternative c 2 C , and an integer k. The
question is whether one can make c the Condorcet
winner by swapping a total number of at most k pairs
of neighboring alternatives in the voters’ preference
orders. Refer to Refs. [36, 38, 39] for more on the
computational complexity status of D ODGSON S CORE.
Bartholdi III et al.’s integer linear program for
D ODGSON S CORE reads as follows. It computes the
Dodgson score of alternative c, which is the minimum
number of swaps of neighboring pairs of alternatives in
order to make c the Condorcet winner.
X
min
j  xi;j subject to
i;j

8i 2 VQ W

X

xi;j D Ni ;

j

8y 2 C W

X

ei;j;y  xi;j > dy ;

i;j

xi;j > 0:
In the above integer linear program, VQ denotes the
set of preference order types (that is, the set of different
preference orders in the given election), Ni denotes the
number of voters of type i, xi;j denotes the number
of voters with preference order of type i for which
alternative c will be moved upwards by j positions,
ei;j;y is 1 if the result of moving alternative c by j
positions upward in a preference order of type i is that
c gains an additional voter support against alternative
y, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, dy is the deficit of
c with respect to alternative y, that is, the minimum
number of voter supports that c must gain against y to
defeat y in a pairwise comparison. If c already defeats
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y, then dy D 0. See Bartholdi III et al.[36] for more
details. Altogether, the integer linear program contains
at most m  mŠ variables xi;j , where m denotes the
number of alternatives. Thus, the number of variables in
the described integer linear program is upper-bounded
by a function in parameter m yielding fixed-parameter
tractability due to Lenstra’s result.
Although solvability by an integer linear program
with a bounded number of variables implies fixedparameter tractability, there is by far no guarantee
for practically efficient algorithms. Indeed, due to a
huge exponential function in the number of variables
being part of the running time bound, the above
fixed-parameter tractability result is basically for
classification.
There are numerous further results[40-45] for voting
problems with the parameter number of alternatives
where so far only using Lenstra’s result leads to
fixed-parameter tractability. In summary, this gives the
following research challenge.
Key question 1: Can the mentioned ILPbased fixed-parameter tractability results be
replaced by direct combinatorial (avoiding
ILPs) fixed-parameter algorithms?
Interestingly, the K EMENY S CORE problem (refer to
Section 3.5 for the definition) is known to be solvable
in O.2m  m2  n/ time due to a dynamic programming
algorithm, that is, there is a direct combinatorial
fixed-parameter algorithm[46] . Nonetheless, in practical
instances using an Integer Linear Programming
formulation with O.m2 / binary variables is much
more efficient, although its theoretical running time is
significantly worse[47] .
3.2

Parameterized complexity of bribery problems

Our second challenge regards the parameterized
complexity of election bribery problems under some
voting rule R. There are several families of bribery
problems but, generally speaking, their main idea is
as follows. We are given some election E D .C; V /,
some preferred alternative p, and some budget B. If
we choose to bribe some voter v, then we can modify
v’s preference order, but we have to pay for it (in
some variants of the bribery problem the cost depends
on how we change the preference order, whereas in
others the cost is fixed irrespective of the extent to
which we modify the preference order). The goal is
to compute which voters to bribe—and how to modify
their preference orders—so that p becomes an R-
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winner and the bribery cost is at most B.
The study of the computational complexity of
election bribery was initiated by Faliszewski et al.[48]
(also refer to the work of Faliszewski and Rothe[49] for
a survey). In particular, they studied the following two
problems for some voting rule R:
 In the R-B RIBERY problem, each voter has the
same price (unit cost) for being bribed. In effect,
we ask if it is possible to ensure the preferred
alternative’s victory by bribing at most B voters.
 In the R-$B RIBERY problem, each voter v has an
individual price v for being bribed.
Note that in both problems the cost of bribing a voter
does not depend on how the voter’s preference order is
changed: The briber pays for the ability to change the
preference order in any convenient way.
Later, Elkind et al.[50] introduced another variant
of the bribery problem, which they called R-S WAP
B RIBERY, where the cost of bribing a voter depends on
the extent to which we modify this voter’s preference
order. Formally, they required that each voter v has
a swap-bribery price function, which for each two
alternatives a and b gives the cost of convincing v to
swap a and b in the preference order (provided that
a and b are adjacent in this preference order at the
time). To bribe a voter v, we provide a sequence of
pairs of alternatives to swap, the voter looks at these
pairs one by one and for each pair swaps the alternatives
in the preference order (provided they are adjacent at
the time) and charges us according to the swap-bribery
function. Elkind et al.[50] also defined a simpler variant
of S WAP B RIBERY, called S HIFT B RIBERY, where
all the swaps have to involve the preferred alternative.
While both S WAP B RIBERY and S HIFT B RIBERY tend
to be NP-complete for typical voting rules, S HIFT
B RIBERY is much easier to solve approximately[51] .
For most typical voting rules, these bribery problems
are NP-complete. A few polynomial-time algorithms
exist only for the simplest of voting rules, such as
Plurality, or d -Approval and Bucklin, for the case of
S HIFT B RIBERY. However, from the point of view
of parameterized complexity theory, there is a huge
difference between the R-B RIBERY problems, where
each voter has unit cost for being bribed, and the other
flavors of bribery, where each voter has individually
specified price. Indeed, when we use the number of
alternatives as the parameter, for typical voting rules
R we have that R-B RIBERY is in FPT (this is implicit
in the work of Faliszewski et al.[48] ), whereas the other
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types of bribery are in XP[48, 50] and it is not known if
they are in FPT or hard for WŒ1, WŒ2, or some further
class in the W-hierarchy. Thus, we have the following
challenge.
Key question 2: For each typical voting
rule R: what is the exact parameterized
complexity of problems R-$B RIBERY, RS WAP B RIBERY, and R-S HIFT B RIBERY
when parameterized by the number of
alternatives?
Interestingly, this challenge is very closely related
to the previous one. For many typical voting rules R,
the proof that R-B RIBERY is in FPT uses an ILPbased algorithm. Having such an algorithm (instead of
a combinatorial one) gives very limited insight into the
nature of the problem and, thus, we cannot use the ideas
regarding R-B RIBERY to build algorithms for, say, R$B RIBERY. On the contrary, there is no obvious way
to extend the ILP-based algorithms to the variants of
bribery where voters have individual prices. The general
idea behind these ILP algorithms is to consider groups
of voters with the same preference orders jointly, but
this does not lead to correct solutions when these voters
have differing prices.
Naturally, some authors have already studied
parameterized complexity of various types of bribery
problems[44, 52] . However, their results regard either
parameters other than the number of alternatives, or
special pricing schemes where voters can be treated as
unified groups and ILP approaches work.
3.3

FPT approximation algorithms

In the previous challenge we asked about the exact
complexity of various election bribery problems
parameterized by the number of alternatives. However,
instead of seeking exact complexity results it
might be easier to find good FPT approximation
algorithms (refer to the work of Marx[53] for a survey).
After all, if the bribery problems turn out to be, say,
WŒ1- or WŒ2-hard, the approximation algorithms
would give us some means of solving them. Even
if the problems turned out to be in FPT, it is likely
that the approximation algorithms would be much
faster in practice. Further, even though for some
of these problems there are good polynomial-time
approximation algorithms (for example, this is the case
for S HIFT B RIBERY under positional scoring rules[51] ),
it might be the case that FPT approximation algorithms
would yield better approximation ratios.
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To see that FPT approximation algorithms can
indeed outperform polynomial-time ones in terms
of achievable approximation ratios, let us consider
the M AX V ERTEX C OVER problem (also known as
PARTIAL V ERTEX C OVER). In this problem we
are given an undirected graph G and an integer k.
The goal is to pick k vertices that jointly cover as
many edges as possible. Note that a vertex covers
all its incident edges. As a generalization of V ERTEX
C OVER, the problem is NP-complete[25] , and it is also
known to be WŒ1-complete when parameterized by
k [54] . As far as we know, the best polynomial-time
approximation algorithm for this problem known at
the moment is due to Ageev and Sviridenko[55] . This
algorithm achieves approximation ratio 3=4, that is, if
the optimal solution covers OPT edges, the algorithm
of Ageev and Sviridenko guarantees to cover at least
3=4 OPT edges. Marx[53] , however, has shown an
algorithm that for each positive number " finds a
solution for M AX V ERTEX C OVER that covers at least
.1 "/OPT edges and runs in FPT time with respect to
parameters k and ". In other words, Marx has given an
FPT approximation scheme for the problem. Recently,
this result of Marx was generalized by Skowron and
Faliszewski[56] . Interestingly, the motivation for their
work came from a computational social choice context.
This discussion motivates the following research
challenge:
Key question 3: For which computationally
hard election-related problems are there FPT
approximation schemes?
As we have indicated, bribery problems are perhaps
the most natural ones to consider here. Indeed,
Bredereck et al.[52] gave a fairly general FPT
approximation scheme for S HIFT B RIBERY
parameterized by the number of voters, and an
FPT approximation scheme for S HIFT B RIBERY
parameterized by the number of alternatives, but for
a somewhat restrictive model of bribery costs. The
existence of an FPT approximation scheme that does
not rely on assumptions about the pricing model
remains open. Schlotter et al.[57] provided an FPT
approximation scheme for yet another bribery problem,
called S UPPORT B RIBERY. Interestingly, we are not
aware of any FPT approximation algorithms for the
B RIBERY and $B RIBERY families of problems.
There are also many other types of election problems
one could try to seek FPT approximation algorithms
for. For example, in control problems we are given
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an election E D .C; V /, a preferred alternative p,
and some means of affecting the structure of the
election. For example, we might have some set of
additional alternatives or voters that can be convinced
to participate in the election, or we might have some
means to remove some of the alternatives or voters. The
task is to ensure that p is a winner while modifying
the election as little as possible. Election control
problems were introduced by Bartholdi III et al.[58]
(later Hemaspaandra et al.[59] extended the definition
to include so-called destructive control) and were
studied from the parameterized complexity perspective
by several authors[60-63] . However, at the intuitive level,
it seems that for control problems it might be easier
to obtain parameterized inapproximability results. The
reason for that is that often their hardness proofs
(parameterized or not) directly rely on problems that are
difficult to approximate.
3.4

Kernelization complexity of voting problems

Kernelization is one of the major tools to prove
fixed-parameter tractability results. In the last
decade, parameterized complexity theory witnessed
an extremely rapid development of kernelization
results. Many problems turn out to admit polynomialsize problem kernels, most of them being graphtheoretical problems[29-31] .
With respect to voting problems, although many
have been shown to be fixed-parameter tractable, only
very few problems are known to admit polynomialsize problem kernels. The main reason for this might
be that a voting problem usually contains as input an
election whose size essentially is upper-bounded by
the number m of alternatives times the number n of
voters. According to the definition of polynomial-size
problem kernels, we need to bound both numbers by
polynomial functions in the considered parameter; it
already seems difficult to bound one out of n and
m with a function of the other. Next, we use the
C ONSTRUCTIVE C ONTROL BY D ELETING VOTERS
for d -Approval (CCDV-d-A PPROVAL) problem to
illustrate this difficulty and discuss how to cope with
it.
Given an election .C; V / under the d -Approval rule,
each voter assigns one point to each of the alternatives c
ranked in the top d positions of his preference order. We
say then that this voter approves c. The score s.c/ of an
alternative c is the total number of points it gains from
all the voters. The alternative with the highest score
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wins the election. The CCDV-d-A PPROVAL problem
asks for a list of at most k voters whose deletion
from V makes a distinguished alternative p win the
election. CCDV-d-A PPROVAL is NP-hard for every
constant d > 3[64] .
It is not hard to show that CCDV-d-A PPROVAL is
fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number k
of deleted voters. Observe that the alternatives c with
s.c/ < s.p/ are irrelevant for control by deleting voters
since the voters approving p will never be deleted from
V . Let I denote the set of all irrelevant alternatives,
and R WD C n .I [ fpg/. Since each alternative c in R
satisfies s.c/ > s.p/, we have to delete at least one
voter from V who approves c. By the definition of d Approval, deleting k voters can decrease the scores of
at most d  k alternatives, and thus jRj 6 d  k. Let Vp
be the list of voters in V approving p and VR the list
of voters approving at least one alternative in R but not
p. Obviously, the voters deleted should be all from VR .
With jRj 6 d  k, we can partition VR into at most
O..d  k/d / many classes, each class containing the
voters in VR which approve the same subset of R. A
brute-force algorithm can then be applied to guess the
number of voters to be deleted from each class, resulting
in an FPT running time.
With respect to deriving a polynomial problem kernel
for CCDV-d-A PPROVAL, we further need to bound
jI j and jV j. Deleting voters who solely approve the
alternatives in I do not help making p win and can
be safely “removed” from the voter list V . Thus,
we can assume that the voters in V who approve
an irrelevant alternative should also approve p or at
least one alternative from R. This means that V D
Vp [ VR . Therefore, the key is to bound jVp j and
jVR j. However, although the number of the classes
of voters in VR is bounded, the number of voters in
each class can be unbounded. The same holds also for
Vp , even if none of the voters in Vp will be deleted.
Due to the relation between the scores of p and of
the alternatives in R, we cannot reduce Vp and VR
independently. The kernelization algorithm of Wang
et al.[17] performs a “reconstruction” approach, that
is, it keeps only the “essential” part of the instance,
which consists of particular voters in VR , and then
constructs a new instance around this essential part with
new irrelevant alternatives and some new voters. The
decisive idea behind this approach is to restore the score
difference between s.p/ and s.c/ for every c 2 R after
the reconstruction; but s.p/ and s.c/ are much less than

Tsinghua Science and Technology, August 2014, 19(4): 358-373

in the original instance and, thus, the number of voters
needed can be bounded by a function of k.
The kernelization algorithm of Wang et al.[17]
achieves a polynomial problem kernel for CCDV-dA PPROVAL with d being a constant; note that, with
unbounded d , CCDV-d-A PPROVAL is WŒ2-hard with
respect to k [17] . It is conceivable that this reconstruction
approach could lead to problem kernels for other fixedparameter tractable control problems[65] . However,
compared to the diverse general tools for deriving
polynomial (even linear) problem kernels for graphbased problems, the research on kernelization for such
two-dimensional problems as voting problems seems
little developed. Only very few problem kernel results
for voting problems are known so far. Thus, to close
this gap is a major challenge.
Key question 4: What is the kernelization
complexity of fixed-parameter tractable
voting problems with respect to the number
m of alternatives, the number n of voters, or
some parameter less than m or n? Can we
derive polynomial (or even linear) problem
kernels for some voting problems with the
above parameters?
3.5

Partial problem kernels

As already discussed in the previous section, the input
to a voting problem contains an election whose size
is upper-bounded by the number of alternatives times
the number of voters. In addition, the input can also
contain prices per voter or per position for each voter’s
preference order. Either the number of alternatives, the
number of voters, or the total price are promising as a
parameter for performing a parameterized complexity
analysis because there are applications where either of
these parameters is relatively small when compared to
the other. For instance, in aggregating the outcomes
of different search engines with the help of a metasearch engine, the number of voters is (relatively)
small but the number of alternatives is large. In
political voting, the situation should typically be the
other way round. In terms of developing kernelization
results, however, the current knowledge indicates a
certain asymmetry with respect to both parameters, “the
number m of alternatives” and “the number n of voters”.
While we have often positive results when exploiting
parameter m, for parameter n fewer positive results are
known[9] . Indeed, this also motivates the concept of
“partial problem kernels”.
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Formally, a decision problem L with input instance
.I; k/ is said to admit a partial kernel if there is a
computable function d W ˙  ! N such that
(1) L is decidable in FPT time for parameter d.I /,
and
(2) There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given
.I; k/, computes an equivalent instance .I 0 ; k 0 /
such that k 0 6 f .k/ and d.I 0 / 6 g.k/ with f; g W
N ! N.
We will discuss this issue using the rank aggregation
problem K EMENY S CORE as a concrete example.
Informally speaking, K EMENY S CORE asks, given an
election E D .C; V / and a positive number k, whether
there is a median ranking, that is, a linear order over
C whose total number of inversions with the voters’
preference orders from E is at most k. The score of
such a ranking is the total number of inversions needed.
A Kemeny ranking of an election is a median ranking
with minimum score. An example election with four
alternatives and three voters is illustrated in Fig. 1. It
has only one Kemeny ranking a1  a2  a3  a4 with
score four.
Surprisingly, K EMENY S CORE remains NP-hard
when the input election E has only four voters[66, 67] .
In particular, this implies that there is no hope
for fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the
parameter “number of voters”. On the contrary, it is
straightforward to observe that a simple brute-force
search already yields fixed-parameter tractability with
respect to the number of alternatives[46] .
As a matter of fact, there are further natural
parameterizations of K EMENY S CORE[46] . In particular,
one may ask whether K EMENY S CORE becomes (more)
tractable if the preference orders of the input election
are very similar on average, that is, the sum over
their pairwise differences divided by the number of
pairs is small. Let us call the smallest integer at
least as large as this value parameter da . Developing a
dynamic programming algorithm[46] , it has been shown
that K EMENY S CORE is fixed-parameter tractable for
parameter da with running time 16da  poly.n C m/
where poly is a polynomial function. Based on this,
one immediately obtains a trivial problem kernel of
size O.16da / for parameter da . A natural follow-up
question concerns the existence of a problem kernel of
smaller size or even of polynomial size for K EMENY
S CORE when parameterized by da . We only have
partially positive results here. The question whether we
can upper-bound both the number of alternatives and
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v1 : a1  a2  a3  a4
v2 W a1  a2  a4  a3
v3 W a3  a2  a1  a4
Fig. 1 An election with four alternatives and three
voters. The unique Kemeny ranking is a1  a2  a3  a4
with score four.

the number of voters by a polynomial function in da
by means of polynomial-time data reduction remains
open. It is, however, possible to upper-bound the
number of alternatives by a linear function in da [47, 68] .
Since K EMENY S CORE is decidable in FPT time for
m, it admits a partial kernel. This concept has also been
used in other application contexts, some of them outside
the field of computational social choice[52, 69, 70] .
Partial problem kernels of polynomial size have
been shown to be useful to improve fixed-parameter
tractability results. It is unclear, however, whether or
not some of the partial kernelization results mentioned
can be replaced by “full kernelization” results. This
leads to the following challenge.
Key question 5: Can the known partial
problem kernels be improved to (full) problem
kernels with non-trivial size bounds?
We mention in passing that, focusing on voting
problems, it might help to use weights for voters
to obtain (full) problem kernels with non-trivial
size bounds; however, this would not be a “plain”
kernelization (where the kernelized instance needs to
be of “same type” as the input instance) in case of
unweighted input voters and may hide computational
complexity in the weight functions by modifying the
problem.
3.6

Parameterizations of election data

Social choice theory is full of (combinatorial and
algorithmic) results on voting problems. Many of
these results are centered around general elections,
where every ordering of the alternatives is a feasible
preference for any voter and where every combination
of alternative orderings yields a feasible election. For
instance, Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows the
impossibility of preference aggregation for general
elections under certain axioms (unrestricted domain,
non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence
of irrelevant alternatives). Another example is the result
of Hemaspaandra et al.[39] that establishes hardness
of determining the winner in Dodgson elections with
general elections.

366

For this reason, one research branch concentrates on
the investigation of specially structured elections, where
only certain combinations of alternative orderings are
feasible.
 An election is single-peaked if there exists a linear
order of the alternatives such that any voter’s
preference along this order is either (1) always
strictly increasing, (2) always strictly decreasing,
or (3) first strictly increasing and then strictly
decreasing. The example in Fig. 2 shows a singlepeaked election with five alternatives and three
voters.
 An election is single-crossing if there exists a
linear order of the voters such that for any pair of
alternatives along this order, either (1) all voters
have the same opinion on the ordering of these two
alternatives or (2) there is a single spot where the
voters switch from preferring one alternative to the
other one.
 An election is one-dimensional Euclidean if there
exists an embedding of alternatives and voters into
the real numbers, such that every voter prefers the
nearer one of each pair of alternatives.
It is known that Arrow’s impossibility result
disappears on single-peaked elections[71] , singlecrossing elections[72] , and on one-dimensional
Euclidean elections (which form a special case of
single-peaked and of single-crossing elections; see
also the paper of Elkind et al.[73] for some recent
discussion of elections that are both single-peaked and
single-crossing). On the algorithmic side, Walsh[74] ,
Brandt et al.[75] , and Faliszewski et al.[76] showed
that many electoral bribery, control, and manipulation
problems that are NP-hard in the general case become
tractable under single-peaked elections.
The
three
restrictions
allow
natural
parameterizations. Yang and Guo[77] considered kpeaked elections as a generalization of single-peaked
elections, every preference order can have at most k
peaks (that is, at most k rising streaks that alternate
with falling streaks). Similarly, we can generalize
single-crossing elections to k-crossing elections, where
for every pair of alternatives there are at most k
spots where the voters switch from preferring one
alternative to the other one. A natural generalization of
one-dimensional Euclidean elections are k-dimensional
Euclidean elections, where alternatives and voters are
embedded in k-dimensional Euclidean space.
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v1 W a1  a2  a3  a4  a5
v2 W a3  a4  a2  a1  a5
v3 W a3  a2  a1  a4  a5
Fig. 2 An election with five alternatives and three voters. It
is single-peaked with respect to the orders a1  a2  a3 
a4  a5 and a4  a3  a2  a1  a5 , and to their reverse
orders.

Key question 6: How does the complexity of
the standard bribery, manipulation and control
problems in election systems depend on the
parameter k for (1) k-peaked, (2) k-crossing,
(3) k-dimensional Euclidean elections?
The first step in this direction would be to get a
good combinatorial understanding of such elections.
The literature contains forbidden substructure
characterizations for single-peaked elections[78]
and for single-crossing elections[79] . Knoblauch[80]
discussed the structure of one-dimensional Euclidean
elections. Bogomolnaia and Laslier[81] investigated the
restrictiveness of k-dimensional Euclidean elections. To
our knowledge, the combinatorial structure of the above
parameterized variants has not been investigated so far.
3.7

Distance to tractable cases

“Treewidth” is a famous concept in algorithmic graph
theory. Informally speaking, it uses a natural number
to express how far a given undirected graph is away
from being a tree: A graph with treewidth one is
a tree or a forest, and the smaller the treewidth is,
the closer the graph is to being a tree[82-84] . The
interest for treewidth stems from the fact that many
NP-hard graph problems can be solved efficiently
(say by greedy or dynamic programming algorithms)
when restricted to trees. Hence, it is natural to ask
whether such tractability results can be extended
beyond trees. Treewidth is one measure that turned out
particularly useful for such a quest. More specifically,
many NP-hard graph problems (including C LIQUE,
I NDEPENDENT S ET, and D OMINATING S ET) can be
solved in linear time on graphs with bounded treewidth
(assuming that a corresponding “tree decomposition”
is part of the input)[26, 28, 82, 83] . Put differently, these
problems are fixed-parameter tractable with respect to
the parameter “treewidth” of the input graph.
Also in the context of voting, there exist certain
structural properties of inputs that make some of the
otherwise NP-hard problems tractable. For instance,
under single-peakedness (as discussed in Section 3.6)
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many computationally hard winner determination
problems, including K EMENY S CORE[75] (as discussed
in Section 3.5), turn out to be polynomial-time solvable.
In analogy to the step from actual trees to “nearly”
trees (that is, graphs with bounded treewidth), the
computational social choice community has taken the
step from actual single-peakedness to “nearly” singlepeakedness, all in the spirit of pushing the borders
of tractability. The following notions of nearly singlepeaked elections have been studied in Refs. [85-89].
(1) Elections that can be made single-peaked by
deletion of k voters (also called Maverick voters).
(2) Elections that can be made single-peaked by
deletion of k alternatives.
(3) Elections that can be made single-peaked by
k swaps in the preferences of every voter.
(4) Elections that can be made single-peaked by
contracting groups of up to k alternatives into
single alternatives (here the alternatives of every
contracted group must show up consecutively in
the preferences of every voter).
Each of these notions introduces a distance measure
(or width measure) to the tractable case of singlepeakedness. In the same spirit, Elkind et al.[90] ,
Bredereck et al.[85] , and Cornaz et al.[87] introduced
distance measures of elections to the tractable case of
single-crossingness (as discussed in Section 3.6) and
to the tractable case of group separability (an election
is group separable if the alternatives can be partitioned
into two non-empty groups such that every voter prefers
all alternatives of one group to all alternatives of the
other group).
Altogether, these approaches lead to natural and
meaningful “width-bounded” measures for preference
orders which shall, in the same spirit as treewidth
and other width-related parameters do for graphs,
lead to interesting special cases allowing to obtain
fixed-parameter tractability results for social choice
problems with respect to these width parameters.
Of course, coming up with natural and meaningful
“width-bounded” measures is an ongoing challenging
task. Nonetheless, considering the huge amount and
great success of work on width measures for graphs,
there appear to be many research opportunities
for working on these measures in the context of
voting and related problems. We remark that, from
the viewpoint of parameterized complexity analysis,
such investigations would fall under the category
“distance from triviality”-parameterizations[91, 92] . For
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applications in computational social choice, this line
of research is still in its infancy with few results[87] ,
leading to the following generic challenge.
Key question 7: How can natural and
meaningful “width-based” parameters be
used to gain (practically useful) fixedparameter tractability results for NP-hard
voting problems?
3.8

W-hierarchy and majority-based problems

This theoretical challenge is about creating a framework
that could simplify the W-hierarchy classification
of problems using majority-based properties which
naturally occur in Computational Social Choice.
Problems that are presumably not fixed-parameter
tractable are usually classified in the W-hierarchy
which is defined via the W EIGHTED W EFT-t D EPTH-d
C IRCUIT S ATISFIABILITY (WCS(t ,d )) problem[26] .
The input of WCS(t ,d ) is a Boolean circuit (formally,
these are vertex-labeled directed acyclic graphs) of
depth d and weft t, and an integer bound k. The
question is whether there is a satisfying assignment of
weight k. In this context, Boolean circuits are allowed
to contain NOT gates, small AND and OR gates of
fan-in at most two, and large AND and OR gates of
arbitrary finite fan-in. The weft of a Boolean circuit is
the maximum number of large gates on a path from an
input to the output. The depth is the maximum number
of all gates on a path from an input to the output. The
weight of an assignment is the number of variables set
to TRUE.
For any t > 1, WŒt  is the class of parameterized
problems for which a parameterized reduction to
WCS(t; d ) exists for some constant d > 1 (regarding
the parameter k).
Classifying a parameterized problem in the Whierarchy consists of two parts. The first part is to show
WŒt -membership for some integer t . This is often done
by providing a parameterized reduction to WCS(t,d )
for some d or to a parameterized problem which is
already known to be in WŒt .
The second part is to find a lower bound on the
complexity, that is, to find some integer t 0 such that
the problem is WŒt 0 -hard. This is usually done by
describing a parameterized reduction from some known
WŒt 0 -hard problem. In the ideal case, where t D t 0 , one
precisely classifies the problem within the W-hierarchy.
It is also possible that one cannot find a t such that the
problem is in WŒt , because the problem is WŒt 0 -hard
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for all t 0 or WŒP -hard or LOGSNP-hard[93] or NPhard for constant parameter values.
Sometimes showing WŒt -membership appears to be
more challenging than showing hardness. This is due
to the nature of the investigated problem. For instance,
a problem which is based on some majority properties
cannot be easily formulated via Boolean circuits
containing only NOT, AND, and OR gates, because the
majority operator cannot be easily simulated via a single
large AND or OR gate.
A concrete example is the M AJORITYWISE
ACCEPTED BALLOT (M AJAB) problem. Its input
is a set P of m proposals, a society of n voters
with favorite ballots B1 ;    ; Bn  P , and an agenda
QC  P . The question is whether there is a ballot
Q, QC  Q  P , such that a strict majority of
the voters accepts Q. A voter i accepts ballot Q
if jBi \ Qj > jQj=2. M AJAB is WŒ2-hard for the
parameter size jQj of the accepted ballot even if
QC D ∅[40] . However, showing WŒ2-membership
seems challenging. Note that the unanimous version of
this problem, where one asks for a ballot Q  P that is
accepted by all voters, is WŒ2-complete.
Modifying the set of allowed gates in WCS(t ,d )
dramatically simplifies the task of finding a membership
proof but it may lead to a slightly different W-hierarchy:
For instance, we can show that M AJAB can be reduced
to a WCS(2,d ) problem variant, where instead of NOT,
AND, or OR gates, majority gates (which output TRUE
if the majority of inputs is TRUE) are used. This version
of the problem which we call WCS(t,d )(M AJ), and the
corresponding W(Maj)-hierarchy have been studied by
Fellows et al.[94] While WŒ1 D WŒ1(Maj), for t > 2,
it is only known that WŒt   WŒt (Maj). It would
be interesting to know whether WŒt (Maj)  WŒt 
also holds. If one cannot show this, then it would
be nice to have WŒt (Maj)-complete problems to show
intractability results.
Key question 8: How does the W(Maj)hierarchy relate to the classical W-hierarchy?
What are accessible complete problems for
the W(Maj)-hierarchy?
Besides majority variants of S ET C OVER and
H ITTING S ET (see Ref. [94], Section 7) promising
natural candidates like M AJAB for WŒ2(Maj)complete problems may occur in the context of
computational social choice, where majority-based
properties such as Condorcet winner frequently occur.
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3.9

Cake cutting

In the cake division problem, n > 2 players want to cut
a cake into n pieces so that every player gets a “fair”
share of the cake according to his own private measure.
The cake represents a heterogeneous divisible good, and
usually is modeled as the unit-interval C D Œ0; 1. Every
player p (1 6 p 6 n) has his own measure p on the
subsets of C . These measures are assumed to be wellbehaved, and to satisfy the following conditions:
(1) Positivity: p .X / > 0 for all ∅ ¤ X  C .
(2) Additivity: p .X / C p .X 0 / D p .X [ X 0 / for
disjoint subsets X; X 0  C .
(3) Continuity: For every X  C and for every 
with 0 6  6 1, there exists a subset X 0  X
such that p .X 0 / D   p .X /.
(4) Normalization: p .C / D 1.
A cake division is proportional if every player
receives a piece that he values at least 1=n; the division
is envy-free if every player p gets a piece that he values
at least as much as the piece of any other player; it is
equitable if every player p gets a piece that he values
exactly 1=n. A protocol is a procedure that controls the
division process of the cake C .
The book[7] by Robertson and Webb provides an
excellent summary of the area, and in particular covers
all kinds of algorithmic aspects. There already exists
a rich literature on cake cutting, and various authors
have come up with dozens of proportional or envyfree protocols. In most of the known protocols, the
measures p enter the game as a black box and can
be queried and evaluated for given cake pieces; the
standard goal then is to design protocols that minimize
the total number of queries. For getting algorithmic
problems in our classical algorithmic sense, however,
we have to fully specify the problem data; in particular,
the measures p must be given explicitly (and not just
as a black box!) and must be represented succinctly. A
natural approach is to represent the measures through
piecewise linear value density functions fp W Œ0; 1 !
R. A feasible piece of cake then consists of finitely
many intervals, and the corresponding measure is the
integral of fp taken over all these intervals; note that
the normalization condition implies that the integral of
fp over the full interval Œ0; 1 equals 1.
Brams et al. [95] provided a three-player example
with piecewise linear value density functions that
has (1) an envy-free division and (2) an equitable
division, but that does not allow a division that is
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simultaneously envy-free and equitable. Kurokawa et
al.[96] also considered value density functions that
are piecewise linear. They design an envy-free cake
cutting protocol which requires a number of operations
that is polynomial in some natural parameters of the
given instance. Aumann et al.[97] considered value
density functions that are piecewise constant, and
additionally require that each player ends up with a
single subinterval of the cake Œ0; 1; in this model it is
NP-hard to find a division that maximizes the utilitarian
welfare, that is, the sum of the values that the n players
assign to their respective pieces.
There are some straightforward parameterizations
that naturally generalize the models that we just
discussed: The value density function of every player
consists of at most ˛ pieces, and each such function
piece is a polynomial function of degree at most ˇ.
A feasible division of the unit-interval cake (for n
players) consists of at most n subintervals altogether,
and every player receives at most ı subintervals. Instead
of using the unit-interval, the cake could also be
modeled as the 2-dimensional unit-square, or as some
simple d -dimensional object (with the dimension d
as parameter); the subintervals then would translate
into simple polyhedral pieces with a small number of
facets (and with a number of additional parameters for
measuring simplicity).
Key question 9: How hard is it to
find proportional or envy-free or equitable
divisions under the above parameterizations?
Clearly, there is an abundance of other ways
for parameterizing the cake-cutting world. As yet
another challenging objective function, we mention the
egalitarian welfare, the minimum of the values that the
n players assign to their respective pieces.

4

Conclusions

The purpose of this work is to stimulate more research
in a promising application field of computational
complexity analysis and algorithmics. Numerous
further research challenges can be found in the very
active and steadily growing area of computational
social choice. Clearly, our selection of topics was
subjective and could be easily extended. For instance,
in voting contexts it often makes sense (motivated by
real-world data) to deal with partial instead of linear
orders, generally making the considered problems
harder. Here, one might parameterize on the “degree of
non-linearity”. Additional interesting (broad) research
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topics would be to further explore on relations to fields
such as scheduling or graph and matching theory. By
their very nature, many problems in computational
social choice carry many natural parameterizations,
motivating a thorough multivariate computational
complexity analysis[98, 99] . Finally, so far there is little
work in terms of algorithm engineering for empirically
validating and improving the performance of fixedparameter algorithms for social choice problems.
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